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This Article argues that the solution of relocating Syrian refugees in Egypt is a feasible solution.
The Syrian refugee crisis has been a major challenge for many Western countries, who have
found themselves between a rock and a hard place, faced with two options. The first option
involved agreeing to host the massive waves of refugees, to honor their principles of human dignity
and morality. The second involved closing their doors to them, in order to protect the quality of
their lives. Many countries made their own choice: some chose the first option, while many others
are still struggling to find a way to accommodate the second choice. Politicians, philosophers and
business executives proposed several solutions, most of which are of proven inefficacy, like those
of Trump and the EU. A third proposed solution sought to relocate Syrian refugees in a third
Arab/Muslim country. This Article assesses this third solution from multiple perspectives:
historical, cultural, legal, economic, and political.
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE DILEMMA OF REACHING A SOLUTION FOR
SYRIAN REFUGEES
This Article argues that relocating Syrian refugees, who are
settled in western countries, in Egypt is a feasible option. The
refugees’ international legal framework places several economic
burdens on Western countries. 1 The increasing number of refugees
in Western countries has paved the way for extremist far-right parties
and politicians to increase their popularity.2 In Germany, the AFD
(Alternative for Germany) won 13% of the parliamentary elections
for the first time in the last six decades.3 In the UK, one major reason
behind Brexit is the immigration/refugee crisis.4 52% of the British
population voted to leave the EU, and thus for the first time in the
seventy-year history of the EU, a member state has chosen to leave
the organization.5 The alternative to the current legal framework will
therefore depend on the national basis of the third host country,
which in this case is Egypt.
Many temporary solutions have been proposed to ease the
trend of the increasing number of refugees in European Countries.6
See generally For Good or Ill: The Economic Impact of Refugees, THE ECONOMIST
(Jan. 23, 2016), https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/216
88938-europes-new-arrivals-will-probably-dent-public-finances-not-wages-good-or;
Social and Economic Impact of Large Refugee Populations on Host developing Countries,
UNHCR (January 6, 1997), http://www.unhcr.org/excom/standcom /3ae6
8d0e10/social-economic-impact-large-refugee-populations-host-developingcountries.html.
2
See Claudia Postelnicescu, Europe’s New Identity: The Refugee Crisis and the
Rise of Nationalism, 12 EUR. J. PSYCHOL. 203, 203-04 (2016).
3
Jon Henley, German Elections 2017: Angela Merkel Wins Fourth Term but
AFD makes gains- as it happened, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 24, 2017, 4:09 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2017/sep/24/german-elections-2017angela-merkel-cdu-spd-afd-live-updates.
4
George Friedman, 3 Reasons Brits Voted for Brexit, FORBES (July 5, 2016,
7:26 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnmauldin/2016/07/05/3-reasonsbrits-voted-for-brexit/#66b712a1f9d6.
5
Id.
6
Jessica Brandt, The Refugee Crisis needs Concrete Solutions- here are three,
Brookings (Sept. 20, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-fromchaos/2016/09/20/the-refugee-crisis-needs-concrete-solutions-here-are-three/; see
also, 8 Ways to Solve the World Refugee Crisis, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,
1
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However, among the many proposed solutions, senior public officials
and business tycoons identified three solutions. The European Union
(EU) proposed the first solution, which was to distribute Syrian
refugees among all EU countries.7 Distribution is based on the
proportional percentage of refugees.8 This solution failed on many
levels. While many countries have honored their international
commitment, many failed to do so. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic refused to accept any share of refugees.9 The United
Kingdom held a referendum to leave the EU to be able to protect its
borders.10 Italy and Greece both suffer from major economic
problems, and the refugees will only place a heavier burden on their
economic development.11 The EU faces a major challenge to identify
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2015/10/eight-solutions-worldrefugee-crisis/ (last visited March 1, 2018).
7
Nils Holtug, A Fair Distribution of Refugees in the European Union,12 J
GLOBAL ETHICS, 279, 282 (2016); see also, Towards a Sustainable and Fair Common
European Asylum System, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (May 4, 2016),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-1620_en.htm.
8
Eleni Karageorgiou, Solidarity and Sharing in the Common European Asylum
System: The Case of Syrian Refugees, 17 EUROPEAN POL.& SOC. 196, 197 (2016).
9
See Jennifer Rankin, EU court dismisses complaints by Hungary and Slovakia
over refugee quotes, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 6, 2017, 10:19 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/06/eu-court-dismissescomplaints-by-hungary-and-slovakia-over-refugees; see also Patrick Wintour, EU
takes action against eastern states for refusing to take refugees, THE GUARDIAN (June 13,
2017, 12:31 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/13/eu-takesaction-against-eastern-states-for-refusing-to-take-refugees.
10
Terry McGuinness, Brexit and Borders: Migration and Asylum, SECOND
READING THE HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY BLOG- UK PARLIAMENT (June 21,
2017), https://secondreading.uk/uk/brexit-and-borders-migration-and-asylum/;
EU Referendum: Hollande Warns of UK exit Consequences, BBC (Mar. 3, 2016),
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-35712463; see also, Angela
Dewan, Brexit: What will Immigration Look like If Britain Leaves the EU?, CNN (June
20, 2016), http://edition.cnn.com/2016/06/16/ europe/brexit-britain- immig
ration-referendum/index.html.
11
For Greek economic problems and refugees, see generally Refugee Crisis
Creating Significant Problems for Greek Economy: OECD, REUTERS (March 10, 2016,
6:18
AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-greeceoecd/refugee-crisis-creating-significant-problems-for-greek-economy-oecdidUSKCN0WC1BC; see also, Daniel Marans, Greece’s Economy is Getting Crushed
Between Austerity and the Refugee Crisis, HUFFPOST (July 25, 2017), https://
www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/greece-refugee-crisis-
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a solution,12 especially with the increasing number of Syrian
refugees.13
Moreover, there are some ongoing negotiations by the EU
with some Middle Eastern countries, to control the latter’s borders.14
One of the major agreements is the EU agreement with Libya to hold
back illegal immigration.15 EU aims to slow down the flow of
immigration, yet the solution will not fully prevent them.16 However,
this agreement has ended with catastrophic consequences. It was not
only categorized as a violation of human rights norms,17 but it also it
revived slave markets.18 Therefore, the EU needs to change its
strategy.
economy_us_56b12f1de4b04f9b57d7b7d4. For Italy economic problem and
refugees, see Italy’s Migrant Crisis Is Europe’s Problem: The Refugee Emergency Calls for a
Common European Fund, BLOOMBERG (July 10, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com
/view/articles/2017-07-10/italy-s-migrant-crisis-is-europe-s-problem; see also,
Patrick Wintour, Presuure Builds in Italy After G7 Leaders Fail to Tackle Refugee Crisis,
THE GUARDIAN (June 7, 2017 1:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world
/2017/jun/07/pressure-builds-in-italy-after-g7-leaders-fail-to-tackle-refugee-crisis.
12
Simon Tisdall, Divided Europe Seeks a Long-term Answer to a Refugee Crisis
that needs a Solution Now, THE GUARDIAN (July 23, 2017, 7:35 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/22/divided-europe-refugee-crisisitaly-serbia-greece; see also, Gianni Pittella, EU needs Lasting Solution to Refugee Crisis,
EU OBSERVER (Aug. 9, 2015, 7:34 AM), https://euobserver.com/opinion/138707.
13
Id.
14
Press Release, Question & Answers: Migration on the Central Mediterranean
Route, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Jan. 25, 2017), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_MEMO-17-135_en.htm; see also, Henry Samuel, EU Leaders offer Support to
Libyan Coastguards, Chad and Niger to Stem Migrant Flow at Paris Summit, THE
TELEGRAPH (Aug. 28, 2017, 7:58 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017
/08/28/eu-leaders-offer-support-libyan-coastguards-chad-niger-stem/.
15
Id.
16
Jessica Losier and Delphine Nakache, The European Union Immigration
Agreement With Libya: Out of Sight, Out of Mind?, E-INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
(July
25,
2017),
http://www.e-ir.info/2017/07/25/the-european-unionimmigration-agreement-with-libya-out-of-sight-out-of-mind/.
17
EU’s Policy of helping Libya Intercept Migrants is Inhuman, Says UN, THE
GUARDIAN (Nov. 14, 2017, 1:16 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/
2017/nov/14/eu-libya-coastguard-detention-centres-migration-mediterranean-unzeid-raad-al-hussein.
18
Libya migrant slave market footage sparks outrage, BBC (Nov.18, 2017),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42038451.
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President Trump, along with a number of other presidents,19
proposed the second solution.20 It entailed setting up safe zones for
Syrians.21 However, this solution was unsuccessful for two reasons.
First, it made no distinction between two different types of citizens:
refugees and internally displaced individuals. Refugees are those who
have been forced to leave their home countries to escape imminent,
life-threatening danger.22 Internally displaced people are those who
face the same imminent danger, yet are able to move inside their
homeland.23 The current estimate of internally displaced Syrians is 6.6
million people,24 while the number of Syrian refugees totals
approximately 11 million people.25 Moreover, this solution violates
the principle of non-refoulement26 This principle is mandated in both

Ercan Gurses, and Andreas Rinke, Germany Seeking Safe Zones in Syria to
Shelter Refugees, REUTERS (April 23, 2016, 8:40AM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/us-europe-migrants-turkey-germany/germany-seeking-safe-zones-in-syriato-shelter-refugees-idUSKCN0XK0BS; see also, Soimeon Kerr and Erika Solomon,
Saudis Tell Trump They Support Safe Zones for Refugees in Syria, FINANCIAL TIMES (Jan.
30, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/d9d6f33a-e6c5-11e6-967b-c88452263daf.
20
Phil Stewart, Trump’s Hopes for Syria Safe Zones may Force Decision on Assad,
REUTERS (Jan. 27, 2017, 1:20 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usatrump-safezones/trumps-hopes-for-syria-safe-zones-may-force-decision-on-assadidUSKBN15B0E5; see Rex Tillerson says US will set up safe zones for refugees from ISIS,
THE GUARDIAN (March 22, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2017/mar/22/rex-tillerson-us-safe-zones-refugees-isis.
21
Julia Edwards Ainsley and Matt Spetalnick, Trump says he will order safe
zones for Syria, REUTERS (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usatrump-syria-safezones/trump-says-he-will-order-safe-zones-for-syriaidUSKBN1592O8
22
See UNHCR, CONVENTION AND PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS
OF REFUGEES art. 1 (1951).
23
Internally Displaced People, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/internallydisplaced-people.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2018).
24
See Internally Displaced People, UNHCR (July 7, 2016), http://
www.unhcr.org/sy/29-internally-displaced-people.html.
25
See The Syrian Refugee Crisis and its Repercussions for the EU, SYRIAN
REFUGEES (Sept. 2016), http://syrianrefugees.eu/.
26
1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art.
33 states “[n]o Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would
be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion.
19
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international law,27 and customary international law.28 This principle
prohibits countries from returning refugees to their home countries,
for fear of persecution.29 Returning refugees to their home countries
would expose them to danger either from Al-Assad, ISIS, or the AlNusra Front forces.30 Thus, this solution faces a legal challenge that
was not addressed properly by Trump’s administration.
Second, Trump did not have a well thought-out plan on how
to return Syrians to their home country, either as regular citizens, or
as internally displaced persons.31 Instead, he took a number of drastic
measures against refugees.32 In January 2017, he issued a
controversial travel ban.33 The ban targeted “seven Muslim-majority
countries - Iraq, Syria, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen. . . .”34
He also suspended all US refugee admission programs for three

See U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Note on Non-Refoulement
(Submitted by the High Commissioner), U.N. Doc. EC/SCP/2 (Aug. 23, 1977).
28
Alice Farmer, Non-Refoulement and Jus Cogens: Limiting Anti-Terror Measures
That Threaten Refugee Protection, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J 36, 37 (2008).
29
Id.
30
Carlo Munoz and Guy Taylor, Syria Safe Zones For Refugees Pose Dangers for
US Alliances, The Washington Times (Feb. 22, 2017), http://www.washingtontimes
.com/news z/2017/feb/22/donald-trumps-plan-for-safe-zones-for-syrian-refug/;
see Dominic Tierney, The Hidden Danger of Safe Zones in Syria, THE ATLANTIC (Nov.
10, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/11/safe-zonesyria-conflict/415134/; see also Constanze Letsch, Human Rights Group Sound Alarm
over Sage Zones For Syrian Refugees, The Guardian (Apr. 12, 2016), https://www.the
guardian.com/world/2016/apr/12/human-rights-groups-sound-alarm-over-safezones-for-syrian-refugees.
31
Josh Lederman and Matthew Lee, Trump Plans to Slash US Refugee
Admission, US NEW (Sept. 26, 2017, 7:26 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news
/politics/articles/2017-09-26/trump-plans-to-slash-us-refugee-admissions; see also
Patrick Wintour, Hope for Refugee Crisis Plan Fall into Chasm Between G7 and Trump,
THE GUARDIAN (May 26, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may
/26/trump-set-to-clash-with-other-g7-leaders-over-refugees-and-climate.
32
Stephenson Emily and Erick Knecht, Trump Bars Door to Refugees, visitor
from Seven mainly Muslim Nations, REUTERS (Jan. 28, 2017), https://www.reuters.com
/article/us-usa-trump-refugees/trump-bars-door-to-refugees-visitors-from-sevenmainly-muslim-nations-idUSKBN15B2HL.
33
Trump’s Executive Order: Who does Travel Ban Affect? BBC NEWS (February
10, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-38781302.
34
Id.
27
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months.35 In July 2017, he decreased the number of refugees
admitted to the US from 110,000 to 50,000.36 In September 2017, he
increased the number of countries included in the ban,37 rather than
announcing a plan that would settle the issue of refugees. Hence,
Trump’s proposal failed both legally, and practically.
The third solution was proposed by Naguib Sawiris, an
Egyptian business tycoon and a political party leader.38 In early 2015,
Sawiris announced that he was willing to purchase an island from
Greece to host Syrian refugees.39 However, his proposal prompted
much speculation about its feasibility and underlying motivation.
Ownership of the land, the question of sovereignty, conflicting
countries’ commitment to refugees and matters of funding, were
some of the major challenges facing this plan. The lack of a feasibility
study backing up his initiative gave the impression that his statement
was nothing more than a media stunt.40 Sawiris’ Free Egyptians Party
(Hizb Al-Masryeen Al-Ahrar) ran for parliamentary elections in
Egypt at the end of 2015.41 His island initiative implied that it was
designed to increase support for the 2015 parliamentary campaign.42
The proposal in Sawiris’ format does differ from the two previous

Id.
Sylie Atwood, U.S. Hits Refugee Limit for 2017, CBS NEWS (July 12, 2017),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/u-s-hits-refugee-limit-for-2017/.
37
Donald Trump Expands Travel Ban to Include North Korea, THE TELEGRAPH
(Sept. 25, 2017), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/09/25/donald-trumpunveils-expanded-travel-ban-involving-eight-countries/.
38
Profile,
Naguib
Sawiris,
FORBES
(Mar.
11,
2017),
https://www.forbes.com/profile/naguib-sawiris/.
39
Ivana Kottasova, Egyptian Billionaire Offers to Buy Island for Refugees,
CNNMONEY (Sept. 10, 2015, 11:55 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/09/04/
news/refugees-island-billionaire/.
40
Lucy Barnard, Sawiris Raw as Deal for Greek Islands for Refugees Falls Flat,
THE NATIONAL (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.thenational.ae/business/property
/sawiris-raw-as-deal-for-greek-islands-for-refugees-falls-flat-1.50242
41
Egypt’s Islamic parties win elections to parliament, BBC (Jan. 21 2012)
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-16665748.
42
To read about Sawiris role in the 2015 Parliamentary Elections see Ayah
Aman, Egyptians Prepare for Elections . . . But Do They Really Matter?, AL-MONITOR
(Oct. 15, 2015), https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/10/egyptparliament-elections-mubrarak-sisi-parties-candidates.html.
35
36
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solutions.43 As a result, this solution needs to be modified to achieve
any success.
The modified form of the third solution is the relocation of
Syrian refugees to Arab or Muslim countries. In contrast to Sawiris’
solution, this Article assesses the reallocation of Syrian refugees in
Egypt, as a third Arab/Muslim country. On the one hand, it focuses
on a relocation site away from Europe. Sawiris’ proposal was to
relocate them to one of the Greek islands,44 while this study assesses
a relocation to an Arab/Muslim country, in this case Egypt. There are
many countries that could serve as potential locations for the
relocation project, such as Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, or Jordan.
However, the aim of limiting the scope of the hosting country to
Egypt is to offer a personalized solution.
Furthermore, this study is limited to Syrian refugees only.
Relocating protected refugees to another country is a complicated
legal issue.45 It needs to be tackled delicately, and separately.46 The
legal status of refugees has been appropriately defined in several legal
terms.47 The Article does not deal with internally displaced persons,48
economic immigrants,49 or illegal immigrants.50 For example,
economic immigration will be tackled with economic solutions.51 In
The Greek did not respond to Sawiris solution at all. See Keren
Blankfeld, Africa’s 10th Richest Man Still Waiting to Buy A Greek Island to House refugees,
FORBES (Nov. 18, 2015, 9:45 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kerenblankfeld
/2015/11/18/africas-10th-richest-man-still-waiting-to-buy-a-greek-island-tohouse-refugees/#1524ce132fde
44
Id.
45
See Solutions, U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES,
http://www.unhcr.org/solutions.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2018).
46
Id.
47
Adrian Edwards, UNHCR viewpoint: Refugee or migrant, Which is Right?,
UNHCR (July 11, 2016), http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2016/7/55df0e556
/unhcr-viewpoint-refugee-migrant-right.html; see also What is a Refugee?, UNHCR,
https://www.unrefugees.org/refugee-facts/what-is-a-refugee/ (last visited Feb. 18,
2018).
48
What is a refugee?, supra note 47.
49
Edwards, supra note 47.
50
Id.
51
MIGRATION POLICY DEBATES, IS MIGRATION GOOD FOR THE
ECONOMY?
(2014),
43
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addition, illegal immigration will be addressed with legal instruments
on a national level.52 Additionally, this study does not pertain to other
refugees around the world, or those who share the same conditions
as Syrian refugees, such as Iraqi, Yemeni, and Libyan refugees.53
Hence, the study is limited to Syrian refugees in Western countries.
This Article does not deal with whether refugees themselves
would accept relocation to a third country, which in this Article is
Egypt. In a future step, a new study will answer this question
separately using a different methodology.54 This study will answer this
question through data collection compiled from interviews with
refugees.55 The study question for this future study is whether
refugees will accept being relocated to a third country. Answering this
question will help with the adoption of the relocation solution.
Therefore, there will be a separate study to tackle this question.
To effectively assess the feasibility of the relocation solution,
this Article is divided into six sections. Combined, they offer a
thorough assessment of an effective and smooth relocation process
of Syrians, from Western countries to Egypt. The first section
introduces the historical background of the Arab refugee crisis. The
second section deals with why Egypt is considered as a good host for
the relocation project. The third section presents the new legal status
of Arabs that will help in the relocation project’s success. The fourth
section tackles the political obstacles and solution to the Egyptian
political regime. The fifth section tackles the economic aspect of the
project, both its revenues and expenditures. The last section outlines
several practical steps to start the relocation process.
https://www.oecd.org/migration/OECD%20Migration%20Policy%20Debates%2
0Numero%202.pdf.
52
On how law can success to fight the illegal immigration, see Michael
Hor, Illegal Immigration: Principle and Pragmatism in the Criminal Law, 14 SINGAPORE
ACADEMY OF LAW JOURNAL 18, 19-21(2002).
53
Donna Racel Edmunds, Muslim Countries refuse to Take a Single Syrian
Refugee, Cite Risk of Exposure to Terrorism, (5 September 2015)
http://www.breitbart.com/london/2015/09/05/gulf-states-refuse-to-take-asingle-syrian-refugee-say-doing-so-exposes-them-to-risk-of-terrorism/.
54
FREDERICK AHEAM, PSYCHOSOCIAL WELLNESS OF REFUGEES: ISSUES
IN QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH 45-6 (2000).
55
Id.
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II. THE ORIGIN OF THE CRISIS: THE ARAB SPRING AND THE
REFUGEE CRISIS
Protests that broke out in the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) by the end of 2010 led to considerable change. The
outcome of these protests has varied from one country to another
and can be divided into three groups. The first group involves
countries such as Tunisia, which emerged victorious from the
transition process after the collapse of their authoritarian regime.56
The Tunisian example provides the most successful illustration of
political and legal change.57 This example was a success that led to the
drafting of a widely accepted constitution that enjoyed the
unanimous approval of the Tunisian people.58 As a result, the
Constituent Assembly awarded the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize.59
The second group consists of Arab/Muslim countries that
failed to make a democratic transition, but nevertheless did not really
suffer significant damage or violence. Clear examples of this second
group are Egypt and Bahrain. After protests in Tunisia successfully
ousted President Zine El Abdine Ben Ali in December 2010,60 the
Egyptians followed suit in an effort to overthrow the Mubarak
regime.61 After the success of the 2011 revolution, the Muslim

56
MOHAMED CHEMINGUI AND MARCO SANCHEZ, ASSESSING
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES TO ACHIEVE THE MDGS IN THE REPUBLIC OF
TUNISIA 9 (2011), http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/capacity/
output_studies/ roa87_study_tun.pdf.
57
Mohamed Samir Koubaa, Democratic Transition in Tunisia; A Rewarding
Path, 23 SEC. & HUM. RTS. 223, 223-224 (2012).
58
Mounira Maya Charrad, Progressive Law; How It Came about in Tunisia, 18 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 351, 351 (2015-2016).
59
Anthony Faiola, Tunisian Group Wins Nobel Peace Prize, THE
WASHINGTON POST, (October 9, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world
/tunisian-national-dialogue-quartet-wins-the-2015-nobel-peace-prize/2015/10/09
/b85871ae-6e1a-11e5-aa5b-f78a98956699_story.html?utm_term=.8a22b62a7293.
60
Tunisia since the Arab Spring: timeline, THE TELEGRAPH, (2015)
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/tunisia/1148
0587/Tunisia-since-the-Arab-Spring-timeline.html.
61
Shams Al Din Al Hajjaji, The Egyptian Judiciary in the Age of the Republic:
The Role of Internal Conflicts in Controlling the Judicial System, 4 INDON J INT’L & COMP
L 363, 378 (2017).
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Brotherhood came to power.62 Following this, the Egyptian army
succeeded in overthrowing the Muslim Brotherhood rule in a military
coup in 2013.63 Since then, Egypt has been struggling with social,
economic, and political crises.64 The Bahraini example, on the other
hand, unfolded much more smoothly, since Saudi Arabia played a
vital role in ending the uprising against the government.65
The third group is made up of countries such as Syria, Libya,
and Yemen. These countries have been ravished by civil war.66 In late
2011, various protests broke out in Yemen, Libya, and Syria.67 These
protests were met with brutality by their regimes, or their allies.68
Escalating levels of aggression led to the breakout of civil war in
these countries.69 Once again, Saudi Arabia played a vital role in
easing these conflicts.70 Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia suffered
unprecedented failure when it applied the Bahraini conflict-resolution
model to these countries.71 This occurred due to uncalled-for
Id.
Id.
64
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http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/the-arab-spring-fiveyears-on-a-season-that-began-in-hope-but-ended-in-desolation-a6803161.html.
69
Maya Bhardwaj, Development of Conflict in Arab Spring Libya and Syria: From
Revolution to Civil War, OPERATIONSPAIX, http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA
/DOCUMENT/7367~v~Development_of_Conflict_ in__Arab_Spring_Libya_
and_Syria__From__Revolution_to_Civil_War.pdf (last visited Apr. 18, 2018).
70
Syrian Crisis: Where Key Countries Stand, BBC NEWS (Oct. 30, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23849587; Chris Stephen, War in
Libya- the Guardian Briefing, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 29, 2014),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/29/-sp-briefing-war-in-libya; see
also Yemen Crisis: Who is Fighting Whom?, BBC NEWS (March 28, 2017),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29319423.
71
Id.
62
63

153

2018

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

6:1

interference from several countries, such as Russia, Iran, Turkey and
the US.72 Their involvement has caused the situation to complicate
matters further, making it more difficult, even for civilians, to stay in
their countries.73 The outcome has been the emergence of the refugee
crisis, which has affected neighboring countries, as well as most of
Europe.
III. THE LEGAL BASIS FOR THE RELOCATION: INTRODUCING THE
NEW ARAB LEGAL STATUS
A. Offer Syrians a Special Legal Status as Arabs
The 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees and its 1967 Additional Protocol are the major governing
legal rules for refugees around the world.74 The Convention and the
Protocol are considered a major part of customary international law.75
However, the current legal framework of regulating refugees is
inadequate for accommodating the relocation solution. Firstly, the
principle of non-refoulement bans any nation from returning
refugees to their home countries, if there is a chance of them being
persecuted in said country.76 Any involuntary return or relocation of
refugees to a third country is considered illegal.77 Any country that
hosts refugees must continue to support them until the situation in
their homeland is resolved.78 As the war in Syria is a proxy war
between Western countries, a solution to the war is far from
imminent.79 The main obstacle of returning these refugees to their
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home country is the continuity of the civil war in their countries.80
Therefore, the complex situation of a proxy war in Syria, Yemen,
Libya, and Iraq prevents any form of permanent solution for the
refugees.81
The alternative legal solution is through national means.
There is dim hope for international action to amend the current legal
framework, in order to face current global disagreements. However,
the only foreseeable solution will be of a third host country. This
entails extending the law of protection to offer Syrians a special
status. This status will be legally equivalent to that of Europeans
within the EU. The new legislation gives Syrian citizens the right to
move freely, live, and work without any restrictions. The name of the
legal status would be “Arab citizenship.” Syrians have previously had
access to Egypt throughout several periods of their history. 82 It
would not be novel to offer them such a status again.
Unlike the European model, the Egyptian Parliament would
introduce the new legal status unilaterally. The EU model is a
convention among the signatory parties.83 In Egypt, the legal status
will be in the form of legislation. The new legislation would give
Syrian citizens generally, and the Syrian refugees specifically, the right
to relocate to Egypt and the right to equal access to the Egyptian
market without a need for a residence permit.
Moreover, the legislation would give Syrians the right to live
without a special work permit. This step would ensure that Syrians
stand on equal footing in the Egyptian labor market. The proposed
legal framework in Egypt is similar to the EU solution – with one
major difference. In Europe, Articles 21 and 24 of the Treaty on the

80
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2018), https://www.britannica.com/place/Syria/The-union-with-Egypt-1958-61
83
Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 21 and 24, 2010 O.J. (C83), 2012
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Functioning of the EU gives EU citizens three main rights. 84 These
rights include: the right to move, reside freely within the territories of
member states, and to petition in front of any European community.
85
Yet, the Treaty does not give preferential or equal rights of work in
certain European countries to other citizens of the European Union.
86
The preference in appointment is always given to the national
citizens, then to other European countries citizens. 87 In the case of
Egypt, Syrians would be given a right to work equal to that of
Egyptian citizens.
The special legal status for Syrians in Egypt aims to protect
them from daily difficulties with Egyptian authorities.88 A recent
legislative enactment in Egypt was passed to give the government the
right to deny the entrance to Syrians.89 After the 2013 military coup,
the army made the decision to ban Syrians from entering Egypt, due
to the allegations of their participation in the Muslims Brotherhood’s
protests against the coup. 90 Since then, Syrians are not able to visit
Egypt, even though previously they had the right to enter Egypt
without any special travel documentation.
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The Egyptian regime will accept Syrian refugees in Egypt, as
long as they are far away from politics. Giving Syrians equal rights to
Egyptians has already been applied on a small scale in the world of
football. Recently, the Egyptian football federation adopted a bylaw
that gives Syrian footballers the right to play with Egyptian clubs. 91
The main rule is that the number of foreign players must not exceed
three. 92 However, the new bylaw exempts Syrian players from this
mandate. 93 Even though this example is limited to the world of
football, it gives an indication of public and governmental acceptance
to the solution.
B. Why Egypt as the Host Country to the Relocation Project:
Cultural Reasons
There are several cultural factors that increase the chances of
a successful relocation of Syrian refugees to Egypt.94 These factors
are: a common language, a common religion, and common social
behavior. The first common feature is language.95 Both Egyptians and
Syrians speak Arabic.96 They differ in dialect only. While most
Egyptians speak Egyptian Arabic, Syrians speak Levant Arabic. 97 In
Egypt, there are several dialects, like those of the Bedouins, northern,
and upper Egyptians.98 Resorting to Modern Standard Arabic helps
everyone understand one another, while preserving individual
dialects.99
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The second common feature between Syrians and Egyptians
is religion. The majority of Syrians and Egyptians are Muslims. Their
political Islamic approach is Sunni Islam.100 Sunni Muslims in Syria
account for more than 75% of the population.101 The two main
minorities in Syria are Alawites and Christians, accounting for 12%
and 10% respectively.102 Egypt shares a very similar religious
demography with Syria. Muslims make up the majority with a
percentage of more than 90%.103 Christians are considered to be the
major minority, making up less than 9%.104
The third common feature between Syrians and Egyptians is
their shared customs and social behavior. The evidence of the two
populations sharing common customs is apparent in that both
countries have adopted a similar civil code,105 with only minor
differences in application.106 Al-Sanhuri was the legal mastermind
behind both civil codes. He transplanted the French civil code
module and implemented some changes to make it comply with
Islamic Sharia.107
The final common feature between Syrians and Egyptians is
their enriching cultural diversity.108 The Syrians have managed to
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integrate into Egyptian society very fast.109 Many have been able to
operate very successful businesses in one of the worst economic and
business environments in the world.110 In 2017, Egypt was ranked
122 out of 190 countries in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business
data, a measurement of creating and operating business regulations
across the world.111 Within this unwelcome economic environment,
Syrians were nevertheless able to contribute positively to the
economy of the country.112
IV. POLITICAL OBSTACLES TO THE RELOCATION PROJECT: TOWARDS
AN EFFECTIVE ROLE FOR NATO
NATO would be heavily involved in the negotiation process
with the Egyptian regime. The ability to negotiate with the Egyptian
military regime calls for a specific type of official candidate. They will
need to hail from a military background in order to achieve positive
results with the Egyptian government and regime. Non-military
institutions and candidates would not be able to achieve the desired
results or efficiently communicate with the military regime of Egypt.
In Egyptian contemporary history, the Egyptian army has
dominated the political, social, and legal lives of Egyptians.113 During
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the 1800s, Mohamed Ali Pasha founded modern Egypt.114 He was
Albanian, and an officer in the Ottoman Army.115 After the French
colonization of Egypt ended in 1801, Egyptian jurists formed one of
the early Shura councils, and elected Mohamed Ali to be the Amir. In
a massacre known as the ‘Massacre of Mamluks’ at Cairo Citadel, Ali
killed all the senior officers in the Egyptian army who opposed him.
116
He then led a war against the Ottomans to secure Egypt as his
own property.117 At the end of this war, he became the recognized
and legitimate ruler of Egypt.118
In 1952, the Egyptian military launched a successful military
coup against King Farouk, the great-grandson of Mohamed Ali.119 It
then declared Egypt a republic.120 Mohamed Naguib, who ruled from
1952 to 1953,121 Gamal Abdel-Nasser (1953-1970),122 Anwar Al-Sadat
(1970-1981),123 and Mohamed Hosni Mubarak (1981-2011),124 were
all military officers. There have been very few exceptions to the army
rule, such as Supreme Court Chief Justice Judge Adly Mansour
(2013-2014),125 and Professor Sofi Abu Talib (1981).126 The most
important exception, however, occurred after the success of the 2011
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Revolution.127 In 2012, Egypt had its first civilian president, who was
a professor of engineering.128 His ascension to power lasted only a
year,129 when the army assumed the ruling authority once again in
2013, after a military coup against President Morsi.130
The 2013 military coup resulted in the full domination of the
military over every aspect of the government.131 In terms of the
executive authority, the current President of the republic is FieldMarshal Abdelfattah Al-Sisi.132 Al-Sisi was the mastermind behind the
military coup.133 He was the Minister of Defense during the
presidency of ex-President Mohamed Morsi.134 Al-Sisi has appointed
former army generals as governors.135 As for the legislative authority,
the army formed a political coalition with some politicians and
former Generals called “For the love of Egypt” during 2015
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Parliament elections.136 This coalition was made up of 380
members.137 They were able to secure the majority in the
Parliament.138 Currently, 71 military generals are members in the 2015
parliament out of 445 members.139
As for the judiciary, an incessant massacre of judges, known
as the “judicial massacre,” began in 2014. 140 After the success of the
2013 military coup, many disciplinary trials took place to impeach a
number of judges, who declared their opposition to the return of
military rule of the government.141 Between 2014 and 2016, more
than 200 judges were impeached.142 Military forces, once again, have
become the undisputed authority during Al-Sisi’s rule.
The military judiciary plays a vital role in the military’s
authoritarian regime in Egypt.143 The military judiciary’s
representatives have been members of all the constitutional
assemblies since January 2011.144 They advocate for a special status
for the military judiciary in all constitutions. This is based on two
reasons. Firstly, the army advocates for exclusive jurisdiction of the
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military judiciary over any issues related to the army.145 One of the
aims of this exclusive jurisdiction is to protect army investments.146
The army owns farms, gas stations, factories, and outlet stores.147 It
offers services to the public at a fair market price, without being
subjected to the tax law.148 The 2014 Constitution reflects these
objectives in Article 204.149
Secondly, the 2014 Constitution prohibits trials of civilians
before military courts.150 However, the Constitution allows for a very
broad exception to this rule.151 The list includes prosecution of any
alleged assault against military facilities, military barracks, or any
establishments that falls under military authority.152 Army General
Medhat Radwan, head of the Military Judiciary Authority, was asked
during a television interview whether the army’s facilities, such as the
armed forces’ clubs, military-run factory outlets, and gas stations, are
Id.
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open to the public.153 He asserted that there is no difference between
a military facility for civilians, and a military facility for the army.
Both are military places.154 He replied, “There is no difference
between the solider in these facilities, and the solider sitting on a
tank; it is not his fault that he serves in this place.”155 The interviewer
responded with “ . . . but this is a civilian activity,”156 to which he
replied: “sorry madam, it is not.”157
V. ECONOMIC SOLUTIONS: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
APPROACH
A. Economic Benefits to Western Countries for Financing the
Project
The project does not require any extra allocation of resources.
It encourages Western countries to reallocate their national spending
on refugees. This reallocation is based on dedicating 20% of national
spending on refugee to the relocation project fund. The reallocation
will help Western governments to achieve two economic benefits.
The first is decreasing the number of refugees. Western
countries that wish to decrease the number of refugees trickling into
their countries should allocate a portion of their funds to refugees,
who will be relocated to Egypt. The target number of relocated
Syrians depends on how much Western countries are willing to invest
in the project. If these countries invest 20% of their annual national
fund on refugees, the project shall target to relocate at least 21% of
their refugees. If Germany invests 20% of its annual fund to relocate
Syrians to Egypt, this will help Germany decrease the number of
refugees by at least 21%.158 As a result, the number of refugees who
153
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accept relocation to Egypt must increase each year in relation to the
previous year.
The second gain is investing part of the “wasted” portion of
their national spending. Western countries will invest 20% of their
already dedicated amount of spending on refugees. In 2015, the value
of the 20% of the annual spending by Western countries on refugees
is $25 billion (excluding the EU spending). This portion will be
transferred from the national fund towards the investment,
establishment and operation of the project. Spending on the
relocation project will turn refugees into economic immigrants. The
following table shows the number of refugees in 24 Western
countries in the period from 2015 to 2016. It also shows their annual
spending in million USD. Table (1) indicates the total number of
refugees in 2015 to be 1,683,099.159 The annual national spending on
refugees in these countries was around $125 billion during the same
year.160 In 2016, the number of refugees increased to 2,350,878, an
approximately 40% increase compared with the previous year.161 This
means that the budget for refugees increased at the same amount.
Table (1): Table showing Number of Refugees in Western
Countries during 2015 and 2016 as well as their Average Spending on
Refugees in 2015
Country

Refugees
2015

in Refugees
2016

in Annual Spending
2015

Speigel, REUTERS (May 14, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europemigrants-germany-costs/german-government-plans-to-spend-93-6-billion-euroson-refugees-by-end-2020-spiegel-idUSKCN0Y50DY.
159
UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2015, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org
/statistics/country/59b294387/unhcr-statistical-yearbook-2015-15th-edition.html
(last visited March 2, 2018).
160
OECD, DEVELOPING AID RISES AGAIN IN 2015, SPENDING ON
REFUGEES DOUBLES (2015), http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/ODA-2015complete-data-tables.pdf.
161
Refugee Population by Country or Territory of Asylum 2016, THE
WORLD BANK DATA, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SM.POP.REFG?
locations=DE-CA (last visited March 2, 2018);
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EU

-

-

€4.5 billion with
€2 billion extra
increase in 2016162

Austria

72,216

93,183

$1,207 million

Belgium

35,314

42,128

$1,894 million

Canada

135, 888

97,311

$4,287 million

Czech
Republic

3,644

3,580

$202 million

Denmark

27,326

33,346

$2,566 million

Finland

12,703

18,302

$1,292 million

France

273,126

304,507

$9,226 million

Germany

316,115

669,408

$17,779 million

Greece

13,008

46,381

$282 million

Latvia

208

325

No data

Italy

118,047

147,302

$3,844 million

Liechtenstein

150

156

No data

Lithuania

1,093

1,064

No data

Luxembourg

1,332

1,995

$361 million

Netherlands

88,536

101,702

$5,813 million

Norway

50,389

59,452

$4,278 million

Who bears the cost of integrating refugees?, MIGRATION POLICY DEBATES OECD (Jan.
13, 2017), https://www.oecd.org/els/mig/migration-policy-debates-13.pdf.
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Poland

14,065

11,703

$442 million

Portugal

853

1,129

$306 million

Slovenia

292

439

$62 million

Spain

6,457

12,943

$1,604 million

Sweden

169,520

230,103

$7,092 million

Switzerland

73,336

82,608

$3,538 million

United
Kingdom

123,067

118,913

$18, 700 million

United States

273,302

272,898

$31,076 million

B. Economic Benefit to Egypt, and Syrian refugees
1. Aids: Undercover Bribery to the Egyptian Government
The first spending of the project is in aiding the Egyptian
government. The targeted amount to encourage the Egyptian regime
to adopt the relocation solution is $3 to $5 billion annually from a
total of $25 billion dedicated to the project. According to Graph (2),
Egypt receives an average of $2.5 billion annually from several
sources. 163 The major annual amount of the aid comes from the U.S.
at $1.5 billion.164 The rest of the aid amount comes from several

163
Net Official Development Assistance and Official Aid Received, Egypt, Arab Rep.
(1983-2016), WORLD BANK DATA, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
DT.ODA.ALLD.CD?locations=EG (last visited March 3, 2018).
164
Brad Plumer, The US gives Egypt $ 1.5 billion a year in aid: here ‘s what it
does, THE WASHINGTON POST (July 9, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/news/wonk/wp/2013/07/09/the-u-s-gives-egypt-1-5-billion-a-year-in-aid-hereswhat-it-does/?utm_term=.ece8377b2806.
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other donors, like the EU,165 Saudi Arabia,166 and the United Arab
Emirates.167
The amount of financial aid to the Egyptian government has
been raised twice to reach $5 billion in the years 1990 and 2013.168
The first time was to encourage the Egyptian regime to join the Gulf
War. In 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait.169 In 1991, the Gulf War
Coalition, which included 34 countries, was formed to free Kuwait
from the Iraqi forces.170 To urge the Egyptian regime – during
Mubarak’s era – to act positively, both Western and Arab countries
paid the Egyptian government an extra amount of aid to join the
Coalition, as shown in the graph. The second time was to encourage
the military regime to overthrown Mohamed Morsi. In 2013, Arab
countries, especially Saudi Arabia, were antagonistic and hostile to the
Muslim Brotherhood.171 They financed the 2013 military coup in
Egypt, against the legitimate ex-President Morsi.172 They believed that
the military regime in Egypt, rather than the Muslim Brotherhood,
165
Egypt and the EU, THE EUROPEAN UNION DELEGATION TO EGYPT
(Nov. 5, 2016), https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/egypt_en/1156/Egypt%
20and%20the%20EU.
166
Declan Walsh, Despite Public Outcry, Egypt to Transfer Islands to Saudi
Arabia, N.Y TIMES (June 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/14
/world/middleeast/egypt-saudi-arabia-islands-sisi.html; Ken Karuri, Egypt Secures
$2bn Saudi Aid- Minister, AFRICA NEWS (August 18, 2016) http://www.africa
news.com/2016/08/18/egypt-secures-2bn-saudi-aid-minister//.
167
Maha El Dahan and Stanley Carvalho, UAE to Continue aid to Egypt, Sees
more Stability After Sisi win, REUTERS (May 31, 2014), http://www.reuters.com
/article/us-emirates-egypt-support/uae-to-continue-aid-to-egypt-sees-morestability-after-sisi-win-idUSKBN0EB0GH20140531; Egypt got $23 billion in aid from
Gulf in 18 Months- Minister, REUTER (March 2, 2015), https://uk.reuters.com/article
/uk-egypt-investment-gulf/egypt-got-23-billion-in-aid-from-gulf-in-18-monthsminister-idUKKBN0LY0UT20150302.
168
Ved Nanda, The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: The UN Response, 15 S. ILL. U. L.
J. 431, 431-32 (1991).
169
Id. at 452.
170
Id.
171
Rod Nordland, Saudi Arabia Promises to Aid Egypt’s Regime, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 19, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/20/world/middleeast/saudiarabia-vows-to-back-egypts-rulers.html?mcubz=1.
172
David Hearst, Why Saudi Arabia is Taking a Risk by Backing the Egyptian
Coup, THE GUARDIAN (August 20, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com
/commentisfree/2013/aug/20/saudi-arabia-coup-egypt.
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would better suit their interests in Egypt.173 They offered Egypt
plenty of aid, both in cash and oil-industry commodities.174 Their
policy makers believed that this was the way to buy the Egyptian
regime’s loyalty.175
Graph (2): The Amount of Foreign Aid to Egypt (1983 to

2015):

176

The main economic benefit to the Egyptian regime comes
from aid. Aid aims to encourage the Egyptian regime to host Syrians
and agree to their relocation to Egypt as economic immigrants. The
Egyptian military will not accept the relocation proposal, unless it
173
Rod Nordland, Saudi Arabia Promises to Aid Egypt’s Regime, N.Y. TIMES
(August 19, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/20/world/middleeast
/saudi-arabia-vows-to-back-egypts-rulers.html?mcubz=1.
174
Saudi Arabia Approves $5 Billion aid package to Egypt, ALARABIYA
ENGLISH (July 9, 2013), http://english.alarabiya.net/en/business/economy
/2013/07/09/Saudi-Arabia-approves-5-billion-aid-package-to-Egypt.html.
175
Saudi Arabia immediately stopped all kinds of aid to Egypt once it
realized that the Egyptian regime would not follow, and abide by its regional
policies. See Lin Noueihed & Asma AlSharif, Fuel Aid Halt Suggests Deeper Saudi
Egyptian Rift, REUTERS (Oct. 12, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-egyptsaudi-analysis/fuel-aid-halt-suggests-deeper-saudi-egyptian-rift-idUSKBN12E1N8;
see also Saudi Arabia halts $23 bn oil Aid deal to Egypt indefinitely, MIDDLE EAST (Nov.
7, 2016), http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/egypt-strike-new-oil-deals-iranreport-124526470.
176
See supra note162.
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comes with direct financial benefit. Even though this project is based
on Islamic principles,177 which is the main source of legislation in
Egypt,178 the military regime in Egypt would not consider that as a
valid enough reason to adopt the relocation project. Hence, financial
aid to the Egyptian government is the only way to ensure the
adoption to this solution.
2. Loans for Infrastructure Only: No Military Investment
The second, and major, source of the Project’s spending
would be in infrastructure loans and investments. Egypt has already
received more than a few loans from a number of sources, such as
the World Bank and the IMF, worth about $20 billion during 2016
alone.179 Western countries and financial institutions should offer
Egypt loans on two conditions. Firstly, that the Egyptian government
accepts and takes all the necessary measures to relocate Syrians to
Egypt. Secondly, that the loans are directly invested in infrastructure
projects, and not in military equipment. In return, Egypt will receive
competitive interest rates, and have previous loan settlements
rescheduled.
Moreover, the project shall invest in infrastructure only.
These investments will repair and feed into the dilapidated
infrastructure in Egypt.180 These loans, however, have to be limited to
investment in infrastructure projects only, unless the Western
countries are willing to have both Egyptians and Syrians flee to
Europe. The failure to repair infrastructure in Egypt will result in the
social and economic failure of the Project. The increase of Syrian
refugees to another million or two will place a great burden on the
Supra section II.
CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, art. 2.
179
Egypt Total External Debt (1997-2017), TRADING ECONOMICS
https://tradingeconomics.com/egypt/external-debt (last visited March 2, 2018).
180
Amira Mikhail, Corruption in Construction: Egypt’s Failing Infrastructure,
ATLANTIC COUNCIL (April 19, 2014), http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs
/menasource/corruption-in-construction-egypt-s-failing-infrastructure; see Ruth
Michaelson, Egypt’s Economy is in Crisis. So Why is the Government Spending Millions on a
Fancy New Space Agency, NEWS WEEK (Feb. 28, 2017), http://www.newsweek.com
/2017/03/10/egypts-economy-crisis-government-spending-millions-new-spaceagency-561743.html.
177
178
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infrastructure of Egypt. Hence, there is an urgency to increase the
scope and intensity of infrastructure projects.
The loans are restricted to infrastructure. Military or security
loans to Egypt will be banned from any money coming from the
Project. The military regime in Egypt lacks the competencies to
invest in any line of business except the army and military
operations.181 If the loans are handed to the military regime to invest
in infrastructure without any direct supervision, the loans will be
spent on military operations.182 In 2016, Egypt received loans from
Western donors to the tune of $19.5 billion as shown in Graph (3).183
The current Egyptian debt jumped to more than $73 billion. This
increase in debt was invested mainly to buy weapons from France,184
Russia,185 and Germany.186 In 2015, Egypt imported weapons for
more than $5 billion. Egypt signed an agreement for $11.9 billion for
the transfer of arms.187

181
See CARNEGIE MIDDLE EAST CENTER, THE MILITARY EMPIRE IN
EGYPT, SHANA MARSHALL, THE EGYPTIAN ARMED FORCES AND THE REMAKING
OF AN ECONOMIC EMPIRE
(April 2015), http://carnegieendowment.
org/files/egyptian_armed_forces.pdf; see also Margaret Suter, Why is Egypt’s Sisi
Buying Arms From Kim Jong Un?, NEWS WEEK(Sept. 19, 2017),
http://www.newsweek.com/why-egypts-sisi-buying-arms-kim-jong-un-667587.
182
Id.
183
Hossam Mounir, Egypt’s Foreign Debt Jumps by $19.5bn 2016, DAILY
NEWS EGYPT (April 2, 2017), https://dailynewsegypt.com/2017/04/02/egyptsforeign-debt-jumps-19-5bn-2016/.
184
Egypt, France to Sign Arms Deal Mid-April, DEFENSE NEWS,
https://www.defensenews.com/industry/2016/04/06/egypt-france-to-sign-armsdeal-mid-april/ (last visited March 1, 2018).
185
David Schenker &Eric Trager, Egypt’s Arms Deal With Russia: Potential
Strategic Costs, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE (March 4, 2014), http://www.
washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/egypts-arms-deal-with-russiapotential-strategic-costs; see also Russia, Egypt seal Preliminary Arms Deal Worth $ 3.5
billion: Agency, REUTERS (Sept.17, 2014), http://uk.reuters.com/article/us-russiaegypt-arms/russia-egypt-seal-preliminary-arms-deal-worth-3-5-billion-agencyidUSKBN0HC19T20140917.
186
Egypt’s Navy Receives First Submarine From Germany, ISRAEL
DEFENSE, (April 20, 2017), http://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/node/29290.
187
Catherine A. Theohary, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing
Nations, 2008-2015, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE , https://fas.org/sgp
/crs/weapons/R44716.pdf.
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Graph (3) Egypt Total External Debt:188

The second aim of the loans is to initiate high-labor
infrastructure projects. The loans should be invested in building
airports, railroads, solar energy projects, schools, universities, and
hospitals. This type of investment will not only raise the level of
infrastructure in Egypt to accommodate an extra couple of million of
Syrians, but will also provide many direct and indirect job
opportunities for newcomers. In 2016, the solar energy industry in
the US successfully employed more than 250,000 workers.189
Investing in the solar energy sector in Egypt could accommodate
similar numbers.190 There is high potential in Egypt to invest in this
sector, as solar power in Egypt is available all year round.191
Emulating Frankfurt airport in Egypt as a transit station to connect
Europe to Africa will provide at least 20,000 direct jobs.192 This
number could lead to 80,000 indirect jobs.193

Supra note 179.
Kirsten Korosec, US Solar Jobs Jumped Almost 25% in the Past Year,
FORTUNE (Feb. 7, 2017) http://fortune.com/2017/02/07/us-solar-jobs-2016/.
190
Shams Al Din Al Hajjaji, Replacement Policy for Nuclear Energy for Peaceful
Purposes: An Environmental Approach, 29 ENVIR. CLAIMS J. 235, 238 (2017).
191
Id.
192
Facts and Figures of Frankfurt Airport 2016, FRANKFURT AIRPORT,
https://www.frankfurt-airport.com/en/flights---more/transfer.detail.suffix.html
/article/b2b/airlines_tourism/airlines/facts-and-figures.html (last visited March 2,
2018).
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Id.
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189

172

2018

NATO, the EU, and the Arab Refugee Crisis

6:1

3. Direct Investment in Relocation of Syrians in Egypt:
The third major expenditure item in the relocation project
will be direct investments in Syrians, who accept to relocate to Egypt.
The direct investment helps Syrian entrepreneurs to find their own
jobs. Two-thirds of Syrians in Egypt are entrepreneurs, who have not
requested any assistance from the Egyptian government or the
UNHCR. According to the UNHCR, the official number of Syrian
refugees is estimated to total 150,000 refugees.194 The number of
non-registered Syrians is estimated to be over half a million.195
Additionally, the direct investment in Syrians, who accept to relocate
in Egypt, will adopt the Muhammed Yunus approach of social
investment.196 The main aim of such an investment plan is to help
Syrians, not to take advantage of them. Syrian refugees have plenty of
success stories.197 They just need an opportunity; hence investment
projects will make sure that Syrians are able to enjoy equal and fair
opportunities in the labor market.

194
Joint Assessment for Syrian Refugees in Egypt, UNHCR (November 2013),
data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=6025.
195
Id.
196
Celia W. Dugger, Peace Prize to Pioneer of Loans to Poor No Bank Would
Touch, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.14, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/14
/world/asia/14nobel.html; see Miriam Cosic, We are all Entrepreneurs: Muhammad
Yunus on Changing the World, one Microloan at a time, THE GUARDIAN (March 29,
2017), https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2017/mar/29/we-areall-entrepreneurs-muhammad-yunus-on-changing-the-world-one-microloan-at-atime.
197
Ishaan Tharoor, Syrian Immigration to the US has been a Success, Study Finds,
THE WASHINGTON POST (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/worldviews/wp/2016/12/13/syrian-immigrants-represent-an-americansuccess-story-not-a-threat/?utm_term=.6c99a7939ff1; see also Simon Kuper, The
Power of a Syrian Success Story, FINANCIAL TIMES (April 12, 2017),
https://www.ft.com/content/ea7c9414-1f01-11e7-a454-ab04428977f9.
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS: WHERE TO START?
A. Formulation of the Negotiation Team: Military Politicians and
Lawyers
The negotiation team consists mainly of military politicians
and lawyers. Politicians are required due to the nature of the military
regime in Egypt, as outlined earlier. The second component is
lawyers. The selection of the lawyers is less complicated than that of
the politicians. The assigned lawyers will help the Egyptian regime
incorporate the new legislative amendments in its national law. The
qualification of these lawyers is based on their knowledge of Egyptian
and EU laws. For the Egyptian law, they need to identify the laws
that stand in the way of applying the new legal regime, such as the
labor law, immigration law, and civil law. As for their EU legal
knowledge, they must have a visionary idea of rights and obligations
of European citizens in Europe. This idea is not to transplant the EU
law to Egypt, as this will not be effective. They must, however,
incorporate the right to equal work opportunities in Egypt.
B. Formulation of the Project Team: Lawyers, Economists and
Statisticians.
The formulation of the negotiation team should differ from
that of the project team, after the acceptance by the Egyptian regime
to introduce the new legal status in its national law. The new team
consists of lawyers and economists. Lawyers in this phase will have to
play a different role to that in the first phase (negotiation team). They
will play two new roles, other than their previous role. Firstly, they
will have to build the legal understanding of the Egyptian public
officials regarding the new legal status of Syrians. The new status will
turn Syrians into economic immigrants with equal labor rights in the
Egyptian market. These rights will be new to the law enforcement
officials, including judges, prosecutors, police officers and public
employees. They will have to be educated through legal training
about the new status, and its ramifications. The second role of the
lawyers is to ensure full legal protection of Syrians from arbitrary
practices that might arise during the application of the project. The
Egyptian regime can introduce other legal and factual barriers against
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the presence of Syrians in Egypt. The lawyers will make sure to sue
the Egyptian government to remove any such barriers.
As for the economists, they will play two major roles to
sustain the project. Firstly, they will help Syrians find employment in
Egypt. This happens either through investing in Syrian projects, or in
creating job opportunities for them. The success of Syrians to
integrate and find jobs in Egypt is the only way to open doors and
encourage other Syrians to relocate in Egypt. Secondly, they will
oversee the use of aid funds, and loans, to make sure they are
invested in infrastructure projects with high employment capacities.
The new loans, as mentioned earlier, are not supposed to be invested
in the purchase of military equipment. Hence, economists will play a
vital role in the project.
Moreover, statisticians help the project administration set its
targets. They will be considered a measure of the success/failure of
the project. Independent statisticians will track the progress of the
project. The project targets relocated Syrian refugees from Western
countries to Egypt. Statisticians have to be independent of the
project, or any other country. They have to issue an annual report on
the progress of the project. This includes the number of refugees
who accept to relocate to Egypt, and from where they were moved.
They will also track the success of the investment of the projects, and
their progress. Moreover, the report has to be issued by a neutral
body. The multinational nature of the project will raise many doubts
about its efficiency. This is also to avoid the misinterpretation of the
data from the project administration, or the Egyptian authorities to
sustain the project, while it may face some burden to relocate Syrians
in Egypt.
C. Initial Timeframe of the Project
The timeframe starts once the Egyptian government
incorporates the new legal amendment in its national law. The initial
timeframe of the project is three to five years. However, an
assessment of the project shall be conducted yearly. After the end of
the first three to five years, a general assessment of the project will
take place to track the progress of the project. In the event of success
of the project, another period shall be extended with the same
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privileges to both Syrian immigrants to Egypt, and the Egyptian
government. In the event of failure of the project, all the privileges to
the Egyptian government will be suspended. The investments in
Syrian people shall continue as an interim period for a couple of years
after the end of the project.
There will be two separate periods between the time that
Western countries accept to adopt the relocation project and the
Egyptian government making all the required legal amendments.
Firstly, the negotiation period is the time invested to reach an
agreement with the Egyptian government. This period is not part of
the timeline of the project. It will be excluded from the initial
assessment period of the project. This period could be protracted,
since there will be a lot of concerns from both sides, Western
countries and the Egyptian side. Secondly, the time until the
amendments is enforced. This period starts after reaching a political
agreement with the Egyptian government. The government has to
take this political agreement to Parliament to enact a new legislation
and amend many of the current national laws. This period ends once
the Egyptian Parliament, which has governmental majority, enacts all
the required laws and makes all the necessary amendments. After
these two periods have passed, the timeline of the relocation project
starts.
Neither the political negotiation period nor the legal
amendment period are part of the project timeline. There is no
foreseen time to reach a political agreement with the Egyptian
government, or to enact a legal amendment from the Egyptian
Parliament. While reaching a political agreement with the Egyptian
government depends on the adoption by the Western countries of
the project, enacting a new legal order in Egypt depends on the
Egyptian government. Failure or success of the Western countries or
the Egyptian government does not have to be part of the project
timeline. Hence, the previous two periods are not part of the project
timeline.

176

2018

NATO, the EU, and the Arab Refugee Crisis
VII.

6:1

CONCLUSION:

This Article is aimed to help the refugees and their dilemma
in Western countries. It assesses several aspects of the relocation
project. The assessment includes both theoretical and practical
aspects. For the theoretical aspects, the Article presents a brief
mutual history between Syria and Egypt. This history has led to the
existence of several cultural common aspects between the Syrians and
Egyptians, their shared language, customs and religion.
The practical aspects include a legal, economic, and political
assessment. For the legal assessment, the Article proposes a new legal
framework to work with the international legal order simultaneously.
This Article proposes a legal alternative on a national Egyptian level
to accommodate the relocation of the Syrian refugees without any
violation to the current legal norms. The challenge of the nonrefoulement principle hinders any form of force to return refugees to
their home countries. Thus, a complementary legal framework does
not violate the current legal norms. The economic assessment not
only aims at facilitating the refugees’ relocation process, but also at
achieving economic gain for both the Western countries and the
Egyptian government. Relocation has to result in economic and
humanitarian advantages for the refugees, the EU, and the host
countries. The increasing number of refugees in the EU is leading to
a growing financial burden on the Union. The Article proposes a
dedication of the internal expenditure on refugees to finance their
relocation project. The high cost of integration and accommodation
of the refugees in Western countries stands as a financial barrier to
invest in the refugees in these countries. The main assumption of this
Article is that Syrians are able to succeed if offered the suitable
environment, as evidenced by two thirds of Syrians living in Egypt.
The relocation project will face some political challenges with
different partners. The most important political challenge lies in the
methods used to persuade the Egyptian government to accept the
project. The Egyptian government hinders the entrance of Syrians to
its territory for security reasons. It disregards all its moral
commitments toward Syria. Western countries as well as NATO will
play a major role in convincing the Egyptian regime to adopt the
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relocation solution. This depends also on the type of politicians
assigned to the negotiation process. The Article proposes that these
politicians should have both military and political experience to be
able to handle negotiations with the military regime in Egypt. The
formulation of the negotiation team is one of the most challenging
tasks of the project. The interim timeframe to reach an agreement
with the regime will depend majorly on the regime to enforce this
agreement. Hence, the formulation of the project teams differs
according to the period of the negotiation. Before the Egyptian
military regime accepts to incorporate the new legal amendment in its
legislation, the relocation negotiation team should consist of military
politicians and lawyers. This formulation will change after reaching an
agreement with the Egyptian government to relocate the Syrians and
to legalize their status. Finally, this project has several assessment
tools to track its success or failure.
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